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"BRING ME YOUR TIRED, YOUR POOR, YOUR
EGREGIOUS TORTS YEARNING TO SEE GREEN:"
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Michael Dwayne Pettyjohn
t
I. INTRODUCTION
Murder. Rape. Torture. Can an alien bring a civil suit in a U.S.
federal court against a party (i.e. individual, corporation, government
agency) who commits egregious acts? Even if the tortuous party is an alien
and the act occurred on foreign soil? The answer is yes, through the use of
the Alien Tort Statute which reads, "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' Created
as part of the first Judiciary Act of 1789,2 this little known statute lay
moribund for 191 years until what some have referred to as the Brown v.
Board of Education3 of international human rights,4 Filartiga v. Pena-lrala5
was decided in 1980. In Filartiga,6 the Second Circuit held that, through
the Alien Tort Statute, a Paraguayan citizen could bring suit against
fJ.D., University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma, May 2004; B.A., History,
University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma, December 1990. 1 would like to dedicate this
comment to my parents, Dwayne and Mary, and to my son, Samuel.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Since section 1350 jurisprudence has dealt almost
exclusively with the "law of nations" aspect of the statute, so will this comment. Also, the
law of nations is modernly known as international law, and the two terms will be used
interchangeably throughout the comment.
2. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77, which reads in relevant part, the
federal courts would have "[c]ognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or
the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. William Dodge, The Constitutionality of The Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations
on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687 (2002).
5. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. Id.
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another Paraguayan citizen who, in his capacity as the Inspector of Police,
kidnapped and tortured to death the plaintiff's son.'
A more difficult question: Can an alien sue a bank for lending money
to a government the bank knows engages in torture, kidnapping and extra-
judicial killings against its own citizens? Even when the government is
only able to stay in power because of the bank's lending activity? This
question is at the heart of a case filed in June 2002 with the Federal Court
in the Southern District of New York, in which South African citizens have
brought suit against Citibank, Union Bank of Switzerland and Credit
Suisse for allegedly aiding and abetting the now defunct Apartheid
government by lending it money, money the plaintiffs contend allowed the
8Apartheid to remain in power. Had this case been brought at the time of
Filartiga, or shortly thereafter, there is little doubt that it would have been
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. This is because section
1350's jurisprudence did not recognize third party liability in the early
1980s.9 In fact, despite its lengthy existence, section 1350's jurisprudence
was underdeveloped by the time of Filartiga due to its lack of use.' °
Consequently, since Filartiga, courts have wrestled with such issues as
what torts violate international law, does the statute provide a cause of
action, what substantive law should control (i.e. Federal Common Law,
International Law, State Law, or Foreign Law), and what should the
statute of limitations be? Regardless, what makes section 1350 case law so
unique is it's tethering to international law. While which torts are
actionable under common law is well settled, what is actionable under the
Alien Tort Statute is not. This is because the more international law
expands, so do the number of torts actionable under the statute. It is this
expansive nature that should give any U.S. citizen, whether an individual,
corporation, or foreign corporation with significant economic ties with the
U.S., pause. In fact, courts now recognize that under international law
third parties may be held liable for another's tortuous acts."
This comment looks at the courts' treatment of section 1350 since
Filartiga with a significant focus on how it is interpreted today. Section II
7. Id.
8. Jessica Tisch, Profiting From Aparthied, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2002, available at 2002
WL 3402482.
9. See, e.g., Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 279-80 (C.D. Cal. 1986)(holding that,
outside of torture, there lacked consensus among the international community as to what
constitutes a violation of international law).
10. Prior to Filartiga, there existed only two cases in which the claims were held
actionable under the Alien Tort Statute: Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795);
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
11. See infra pp. 538-542.
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addresses the statute's construction and constitutionality. Section III
addresses the statute's subject-matter jurisdiction. Finally, Section IV
covers other substantive issues including choice of law, statute of
limitations and remedies.
II. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE'S CONSTRUCTION AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY
A. The Alien Tort Statute's Construction
When compared to the legislative history of any act passed today, the
legislative history of the Alien Tort Statute is virtually non-existent. This
fact led the Ninth Circuit to declare that the First Congress left no intent as
to the statute's purpose. 2 This dearth of congressional intent coupled with
the statute's plain language has resulted in several theories that postulate
what the statute's purpose is, as well as how the statute should be applied. 3
One theory is that the statute's purpose was to improve the United
States' economy. This belief is largely supported by James Madison's
lamentation at the Virginia Convention, "We well know, sir, that
foreigners cannot get justice done them in these [state] courts, and this has
prevented many wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among us.
14
Another theory is that the statute was created to prevent the U.S. from
becoming a safe haven for pirates. A third theory is that the First
Judiciary Act's drafters knew the United States, as a member of the
16international community, was expected to have such a statute .
Admittedly, the statute addresses each of these issues; however, the
stronger theory is that it was created to avoid a potential international
crisis should a state court mishandle an alien's claim.
17
In the late 18th century, international law required a sovereign power
to make its civil courts available for claims of foreign citizens against
12. Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1992); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(Edwards, J. concurring)("[T]he legislative
history offers no hint of congressional intent in passing the statute .... ").
13. See, e.g., Curtis Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article IL, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587
(2002); William Dodge, Which Torts in Violation of The Law of Nations?, 24 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 351 (2001).
14. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 783 n.12 (citation omitted).
15. Peter Waldman & Timothy Mapes, A Global Journal Report: Administration Sets
New Hurdles for Human-Rights Cases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002, available at 2002 WL
3402908.
16. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 783.
17. Id.
2003]
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individuals within the sovereign's territory." The Alien Tort Statute's
origin can arguably be traced back to 1781. In that year the Continental
Congress passed a resolution that recommended that each State enact a
statute that provided "expeditious, exemplary and adequate punishment
for violations of the law of nations" 9 and United States' treaties.
Unfortunately, not all of the States complied with the recommendation.0
The importance of having such a statute was highlighted by the Marbois
affair of 1784.
On May 17, 1784, while at the home of the French Ambassador, a
French citizen, the Chevalier De Longchamps, threatened another French
citizen, French Consul General Francis Barbe Marbois. 2' Two days later,
De Longchamps fulfilled his threat when he assaulted Marbois on a
Philadelphia street.2 2 "The French ambassador formally complained to the
Continental Congress, and the Dutch ambassador threatened to leave the
state unless appropriate actions were taken. ' '23  Fortunately, the
Pennsylvania legislature had complied with half of the Continental
Congress' recommendation: De Longchamps "was convicted by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court for an offense against the law of nations.
2 4
Although the criminal conviction of De Longchamps appeared to satisfy
Marbois and France, and therefore, averted an international crisis, the fact
remained that Marbois could not have sought a civil remedy because
Pennsylvania failed to provide a civil remedy for a violation of
international law) 5
With such a lack of uniformity by the States in upholding
international law, the framers of the Constitution and the First Judiciary
Act were concerned with avoiding future international incidents. The
Supreme Court opined that the Federalist Papers recognized the
"importance of national power in all matters relating to foreign affairs and
the inherent danger of state action in this field . ... ,,26 In Federalist No. 80,
Alexander Hamilton argued fear of international incidents as justification
for a Constitution that granted federal jurisdiction for all cases involving
aliens:
18. Id.
19. Dodge, supra note 4, at 692.
20. Id. at 695.
21. Id. at 694.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Dodge, supra note 4, at 694.
26. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 n.9 (1941).
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The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the
conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever
to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or
perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other
manner, is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will
follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes
in which the citizens of other countries are concerned. This is not less
essential to the preservation of the public faith, than to the security of
the public tranquility."
Accordingly, the courts have generally adopted the reason for
avoiding an international incident as being the purpose of the statute:
"[T]hat the intent of this section [1350] was to assure aliens access to
federal courts to vindicate any incident which, if mishandled by a state
court, might blossom into an international crisis."
'2
B. The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute
The constitutionality of the statute has been attacked on three
separate grounds: (1) whether under Article III Congress has authority to
grant the Federal courts jurisdiction over cases dealing with the law of
• 29
nations; (2) whether application of the statute to torts occurring outside
the United States with no nexus to the United States would exceed the
constitutional limits on federal courts' jurisdiction under Article I1; 30 and
(3) section 1350 is jurisdictional and to use it to provide a right of action is
unconstitutional.31
1. Congress has the Constitutional Authority to Grant the Federal
Courts Jurisdiction over Cases Dealing with the Law of Nations
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority "[t]o define and
punish... Offences against the Law of Nations."32  In fact, it is well
established that the Federal government enjoys complete supremacy in the
3field of foreign relations. Therefore, Congress' authority to provide a
remedy for a violation of the Law of Nations is undisputed. What is
disputed is the fact the Congress has failed to define what the Law of
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 405 (1911).
28. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782.
29. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 499-501
(9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Estate I].
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
33. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 783.
2003]
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Nations is in its creation of the statute. This has forced the courts to
interpret international law in order to determine what torts are actionable
under the statute . Consequently, opponents to this statute argue that
because Article III fails to mention the law of nations in section two,
federal courts lack the authority to hear a case based on the Law of
Nations. 5
In In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation
(Estate I),16 the court concluded that of the nine categories defining federal
judicial power in Article III, only two might authorize jurisdiction for the
statute: the Foreign Diversity Clause, "which enables the federal courts to
hear cases between a state, or its citizens," and the "Arising Under"
Clause, which enables the federal courts to hear cases arising under the
Constitution, laws of the United States, and treaties.37  The court
concluded that the Foreign Diversity Clause was inapplicable because
jurisdiction cannot be predicated on an alien suing another alien (as in
Estate I) under the clause.3"
The Supreme Court has recognized that the "Article III 'arising
under' jurisdiction is broader than federal question jurisdiction under [28
U.S.C.] § 1331." 3' Accordingly, the court in Estate 140 looked to the
Supreme Court's holding in The Paquete Habana41 that "International law
is part of our law . ... , and concluded that the Law of Nations is within
the meaning of the Laws of the United States as found in the "Arising
Under" Clause of Article i. 4 3 An alternative approach to finding that
international law is within the scope of Article III "Arising Under" Clause
34. See infra pp. 532-535.
35. Estate 1, 978 F.2d at 501.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.; see Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. 303 (1809)("Though one party's alienage is
averred, yet it is necessary also to aver that the other party is a citizen.").
39. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 495 (1983).
40. Estate I, 978 F.2d at 502.
41. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
42. Id. at 700.
43. Estate 1, 978 F.2d at 502; see Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass.
1995).
[I]t is well settled that the body of principles that comprise customary
international law is subsumed and incorporated by federal common law..
. to invoke § 1350 by alleging a violation of international law necessarily
require federal courts to examine federal law at the threshold, insofar as
international law is part of federal law. Such cases therefore contain an
,original federal ingredient' and fall well within the scope of Article I1.
Id. (citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
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is to look at the text of the Constitution. The term "the Laws of the
United States" is found twice in the Constitution, once in Article III (the
"Arising Under" Clause) and once in Article VI (the "Supremacy"
Clause). The "Supremacy" Clause reads in relevant part, "This
Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the land."" The phrase
'which shall be made in Pursuance thereof" refers to laws created by
Congress through the authority granted to it by the U.S. Constitution. In
contrast, Article III simply refers to "[c]ases... arising under. .. the Laws
of the United States."46  The inference that can be taken from this
difference is that there is at least one category that is not "made in
Pursuance" of the Constitution. The most likely category is the Law of
Nations, and hence, Article III "Arising Under" Clause includes the Law
of Nations.
A third alternative is by interpreting the statute itself. "International
law.., consists of rules and principles of general application dealing with
the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their
relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons,
whether natural or juridical., 49 As noted above, the Constitution vests
Congress with the authority "to define... Offences against the Law of
Nations."5° It is well within Congress' authority to adopt the definition of
the Law of Nations as defined by the international community rather than
attempt to craft its own. Therefore, through this statute, Congress has
incorporated the Law of Nations into the laws of the United States. This is
different from the first argument (which incorporates the Law of Nations
through common law) and the second (which incorporates textual
inference from the Constitution).
2. To Apply the Statute to Torts Occurring Outside the United States
with No Nexus to the United States Does Not Exceed the
44. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added).
45. Dodge, supra note 4, at 704.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I11, § 2, cl. 1.
47. This argument is strengthen by the fact that the draft reported to the Convention on
August 6, 1787 stated that the "arising under jurisdiction was limited to 'cases arising under
the laws passed by the Legislature of the United States,"' but that language was stricken on
August 27 by vote of the delegates. Dodge, supra note 4, at 703.
48. Id. at 704.
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (emphasis added).
50. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
20031
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Constitutional Limits on Federal Court's Jurisdiction under Article
III.
There is a substantial probability that the framers of the Alien Tort
Statute never intended it to apply to torts occurring outside the United
States. In 1789, it was considered improper for a nation to "regulate by
statute the conduct of foreign citizens on foreign soil."5 "To do so would
be wholly incompatible with the equality and exclusiveness of the
sovereignty of any nation. '5 2 In fact, the principal draftsman of the statute,
Oliver Ellsworth, believed that the United States could not regulate
conduct between foreign citizens on foreign soil." However, the courts
have not accepted this argument in its application of the statute. Consider
Filartiga,4 the wellspring of modern section 1350 jurisprudence, which held
it was appropriate to adjudicate a dispute between two aliens for a tort that
occurred outside the U.S. because under common law, a nation has a
legitimate right to ensure an orderly resolution between two parties within
its borders."
Then there is the Ninth Circuit, which, as this comment will bear out,
typically reaches the same conclusion as the other Circuits, but prefers to
create a new legal path rather than travel down one established. In Estate
I," the Ninth Circuit looked at the paucity of legislative intent and the
statute's plain language (e.g. section 1350 contains "no limitations as to the
citizenship of the defendant, or the locus of the injury"5 7) to conclude that
the statute authorizes a foreign citizen to sue another foreign citizen for a
tort committed outside the United States.'8
As to the issue of the constitutionality of allowing a foreign citizen to
sue another foreign citizen for a tort committed outside and with no nexus
to the United States, the court first looked to Verlinden B.V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria.'9 In Verlinden,6° a foreign citizen sued an agent of a
foreign sovereign on a nonfederal cause of action." The subject-matter
51. Bradley, supra note 13, at 594.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 630 F.2d at 885.
55. Id.; see McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. 241, 248 (1843)(recognizing the English common
law concept of "transitory actions").
56. 978 F.2d at 499.
57. Id.
58. Id. However, a plaintiff must show that the court has personal jurisdiction and
venue over the defendant. Id. at 500.
59. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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jurisdiction was predicated on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).62 The Supreme Court held that when Congress passed the FSIA,
it did not "exceed the scope [the "Arising Under" Clause] of Article III of
the Constitution by granting federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over
certain civil actions by foreign plaintiffs against foreign sovereigns where
the rule of decision may be provided by state law. 63 The court in Estate 14
held that for the same reason established in Verlinden, Congress possessed
the same authority to grant subject-matter jurisdiction in the Alien Tort
Statute with regards to torts occurring on foreign soil between foreign
citizens."
3. Section 1350 Provides Both a Private Cause of Action and Federal
Jurisdiction
It is well established that "[t]he Judicial Code [title 28 of the United
States Code], in vesting jurisdiction in the District Courts, does not create
causes of action, but only confers jurisdiction to adjudicate those arising
from other sources which satisfy its limiting provisions."66  It is also
recognized that a jurisdictional statute can "not alone confer jurisdiction
on the federal courts, and that the rights of the parties must stand or fall on
federal substantive law to pass constitutional muster." 67 These two rules
presented the courts a serious problem: 28 U.S.C. § 1350 requires only a
violation of the law of nations to invoke its usage, but the law of nations is
not substantive law and, therefore, does not provide a cause of action.
"International law . . . consists of rules and principles of general
application dealing with the conduct of states and of international
organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their
relations with persons, whether natural or juridical."'69  Furthermore,
"international law does not require any particular reaction to violations of
law .... Whether and how the United States wished to react to such
violations are domestic questions."7 ° So, if viewed as purely a jurisdictional
62. Id. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (2000).
63. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 491.
64. 978 F.2d at 501.
65. Id.
66. Montana-Dakota Util. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249 (1951).
67. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136-37 (1989); Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 495-97.
68. In re Estate Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Estate I1].
69. RESTAIEMENT (THIRD) § 101.
70. Estate 11, 25 F.3d at 1475.
20031
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statute, section 1350 would simply confer jurisdiction for suits withoutS71
substantive law, and its usage would be unconstitutional.
When the Alien Tort Statue was first enacted in 1789, a court, if
required to adjudicate a suit brought under this statute, would not have
faced this quandary for it was not until 1847 when American law required
lawsuits to have a cause of action.72 Notwithstanding this point, the courts'
solution has been to construe section 1350 as providing both jurisdictional
authority and a private right of action. However, the courts have
articulated different reasons for drawing such a conclusion. In Filartga,
the Second Circuit, in dicta, "construe[d] the Alien Tort Statute, not as
granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal courts for
adjudication of the rights already recognized by international law., 74
Filartiga's progeny has interpreted this statement to mean section 1350
provides both a private cause of action and a federal forum for aliens who
seek redress for violations of international law.75 While most courts have
been content to accept the Second Circuit's reasoning, the Eleventh
Circuit required more: It looked to the legislative intent behind the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA). 76 By enacting the TVPA,
Congress endorsed Filartiga:
The TVPA would establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a
cause of action that has been successfully maintained under an existing
71. See supra, note 67.
72. Dodge, supra note 4, at 704.
73. 630 F.2d at 887.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995)("[The] Act appears to
provide a remedy for the appellants' allegations of violations related to genocide, war
crimes, and official torture... ."); Estate 11, 25 F.3d at 1474-75 (holding that section 1350
"creates a cause of action for violations of specific, universal and obligatory international
human rights standards.... "), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126; Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d
844. 848 (11th Cir. 1996)("[W]e conclude that the Alien Tort Claims Act establishes a
federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to
violations of customary international law."); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D.
Mass. 1995)("§ 1350 yields both a jurisdictional grant and a private right to sue for tortuous
violations of international law.., without recourse to other law as a source of the cause of
action."); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993)("The plain language of the
statute and the use of the words 'committed in violation' strongly implies that a well pled
tort[] if committed in violation of the law of nations, would be sufficient [to give rise to a
cause of action].").
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Since only an alien may bring suit under the Alien Tort Statute,
Congress enacted the TVPA to afford U.S. citizens an equitable remedy in U.S. federal
courts for torts that violate international law, particularly claims of extra-judicial killing and
torture. Id.
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law, section 1350 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Alien Tort Claims
Act), which permits Federal district courts to hear claims by aliens for
torts committed "in violation of the law of nations.,
77
As a result, the Eleventh Circuit held that through the enactment of
the TVPA, Congress recognized that the Alien Tort Statute provides aS 78
right of action.
In deciding that section 1350 provides a right of action, the Ninth
Circuit looked not to the TVPA or to Filartiga and its progeny, but
distinguished the language found in sections 1331 and 1350.79 Section 1331
reads in relevant part, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." 8° So in order to invoke section 1331, the action must "arise
under" the laws of the United States. By contrast, section 1350's language
is absent the "arise under" requirement; rather, it only requires a violation
of the law of nations in order to invoke it application."' Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit concluded, when a plaintiff is able to show a violation of theS 82
law of nations, section 1350 creates a cause of action. Although the Ninth
Circuit held section 1350 did not create a cause of action in Estate I, it
joined the Second Circuit's holding in Filartiga by recognizing that it does
in Estate H.84 In fact, the circuits that have dealt with section 1350
commonly accept this rule.
III. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
It is generally accepted that section 1350 subject-matter jurisdiction is
met when "(1) an alien sues (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of the
law of nations (i.e., international law)., 86  Courts have also adopted
77. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, pt. 1 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86.
78. Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 848. ("Congress, therefore, has recognized that the Alien Tort
Claims Act confers both a forum and a private right of action to aliens alleging a violation
of international law.").
79. Estate I, 25 F.3d at 1475.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (emphasis added).
81. Id. § 1350.
82. Estate II, 25 F.3d at 1475.
83. 978 F.2d at 501.
84. 25 F.3d at 1475.
85. See supra note 75.
86. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238 (Second Circuit); Jama v. Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 363 (D.N.J. 1998)(Third Circuit); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67
F.Supp. 2d 424, 439 (D.N.J. 1999)(Third Circuit); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197
F.3d 161,164-65 (5th Cir. 1999); Wong-Opasi v. Tennessee St. Univ., 229 F.3d 1155 (6th Cir.
2003]
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Filartiga's17 rule that when considering whether subject-matter exists under
section 1350, a court must engage "in a more searching preliminary review
of the merits than is required.., under the more flexible 'arising under'
formulation." ' However, before addressing each subject matter's prong,
this comment will address the first threshold issue a court must deal with
prior to determining if subject-matter exists: Does either the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, the act of state doctrine, or the principles of
international comity bar the plaintiff's claim?89
A. FSIA
Many claims brought under section 1350 implicate foreign nations and
their agents. This aspect can be problematic since sovereign states, and its
agents, are generally immune from lawsuits.90 In fact, until 1952 this
immunity was absolute. 9' However, following World War II, several
nations adopted either socialist or communist governments. 9' These
governments in turn would nationalize major industries within their
93borders. As a result, unfair trade practices arose between these state-
owned companies and private companies (whenever litigation arose
concerning a claim of non-performance of a contract or other wrongful
conduct between a state-owned party and a private party, the state-owned
party would often hide behind state immunity in order to escape
liability.).94
In 1952, in an effort to correct this imbalance, the U.S. State
Department promulgated a new policy and issued a memorandum defining
it to the Justice Department. 95  This memorandum, known as the Tate
Letter, rendered absolute immunity dead when it held that foreign
2000); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 2000)(Ninth Circuit);
Kyler v. Montezuma, 203 F.3d 835 (10th Cir. 2000)(unpublished opinion)(in upholding the
district court's dismissal because the plaintiff was a U.S. citizen, the Tenth Circuit includes
this language); Abeb-Jira, 72 F.3d at 847; Bao v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 19 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
87. 630 F.2d at 887.
88. Id.; see also Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 366 n.1 (E.D. La.
1997); Jogi v. Piland, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1026 (C.D. Ill. 2001).
89. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11; see Estate I, 978 F.2d at 496-97 (the Ninth Circuit
performed a FSIA analysis sua sponte).
90. See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812)(establishing absolute
immunity for foreign sovereigns).
91. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 268-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
92. Id. at 270.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 271.
95. Id. at 270.
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sovereign activities commercial in nature were no longer immune. %
However, Congress's dissatisfaction with the State Department's
application of the Tate Letter's policy led to the passage of the FSIA in
1976.97  In codifying the Tate Letter through the FSIA, Congress
transferred the "determination of sovereign immunity from the executive
branch to the judicial branch."9' The FSIA confers original jurisdiction to
federal district courts in any nonjury civil action for only those claims
enumerated in section 1605.99 In Verlinden,'°° the Supreme Court held that
96. Id. at 271.
97. Id. at 272.
9& Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1330. Section 1605 provides in relevant part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or the States in any case-
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either
explicitly or by implicatiofi, notwithstanding any withdrawal of
the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except in
accordance with the terms of the waiver;
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an
act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for
such property is present in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or
instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United
States;
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by
succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the
United States are in issue;
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the
United States and caused by the tortuous act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state
while acting within the scope of his office or employment; except
this paragraph shall not apply to -
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function regardless of whether the discretion be abused,
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the FSIA "must be applied by the district courts in every action against a
foreign sovereign, since subject matter jurisdiction in any such action
depends on the existence of one of the specified exceptions to foreign
sovereign immunity....' However, courts have recognized exceptions to
the FSIA in addition to those statutorily defined.
In Estate i,'0' the court recognized that although an "agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state for purposes of FSIA includes individuals
acting in their official capacity,"'0 3 an official is neither entitled immunity
for either acts not made in an official capacity (i.e. personal acts) nor acts
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights;
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an
agreement made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a
private party .... ; or
(7) not otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing,
aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material
support or resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for
such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged
in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while
acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or
agency, except that the court shall decline to hear a claim under
this paragraph-
(A) if the foreign state was not designated as a state
sponsor of terrorism under section 60) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 24050)) or
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2371) at the time the act occurred .... ; and
(B) even if the foreign state is or was so designated, if-
(i) the act occurred in the foreign state against
which the claim has been brought and the
claimant has not afforded the foreign state a
reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in
accordance with accepted international rules of
arbitration; or
(ii) neither the claimant nor the victim was a
national of the United States... when the act
upon the claim is based occurred.
100. 461 U.S. at 493.
101. Id.; see also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
102. 978 F.2d at 496.
103. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
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that are beyond the scope of his authority (i.e. illegal acts). °4 In that case,
the defendant, a governmental agent who was in charge of the Philippine
military police, was sued "for false imprisonment, kidnapping, wrongful
death, and a deprivation of rights. .. ."'0' The court held that the
defendant acted beyond her scope of authority and, therefore, was not
protected by FSIA.0 6 In Estate 11,107 the Ninth Circuit commented that its
previous ruling in Estate I was appropriate because "[a] lawsuit against a
foreign official acting outside the scope of his authority does not implicate
any of the foreign diplomatic concerns involved in bringing suit against
another government in United States Courts."''1 8
Another exception is when a foreign state expressly waives immunity
for one of its agents. In Paul v. Avril,'09 the Republic of Haiti waived
immunity for the defendant, an ex-Lieutenant General in the Haitian
Armed Forces who was being sued for acts of torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, and arbitrary detention committed by soldiers acting
upon the defendant's orders.11° In recognizing that the defendant was not
entitled to immunity under FSIA, the court held that "immunity is a grant
in a sense awarded at the sovereign's discretion.'. A third exception to
the FSIA is that it only applies to states formally recognized by the United
States,"' and therefore, organizations that meet the definition of state
under international law but not formally recognized by the U.S. State
Department do not enjoy protection under the FSIA.13
B. The Act of State Doctrine
The Act of State doctrine, when applicable, prohibits U.S. courts to sit
in judgment of acts performed by a foreign state within its own territory.'
104. Id. at 497.
105. Id. at 496.
106. Id. at 498 n.12; see also Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 175 (holding the defendant's activity
was beyond his official authority, and, therefore, not entitled to FSIA immunity).
107. 25 F.3d at 1472.
108. Id.
109. 812 F. Supp. at 210.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 211; see also Estate 1, 978 F.2d, at 498 n.ll (Philippine government waiving
immunity for former president, Ferdinand Marcos).
112. See infra pp. 535-536.
113. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244 (court holding that defendant was head of state not recognized
by the United States, and, therefore, not protected by FSIA).
114. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116. 1183-84 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
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The doctrine's purpose is to maintain a separation of powers by preventing
the judiciary from engaging in matters that may hinder the executive and
legislative branches' ability to conduct foreign affairs.1 5 The Act of State
doctrine is applicable "when the outcome of the case turns on the effect of
official action by a foreign sovereign.'. 6 Accordingly, a claim is barred by
the Act of State doctrine when the following criterion is met: 1) there is an
official act of a foreign state, 2) which is performed within the foreign
state, and 3) the claim "seeks relief that would require the court to declare
the foreign sovereign's act invalid."
' 1 7
The courts have defined an "official act" as being one that is "public
and governmental" in nature, as opposed to those being "private and
commercial" in nature."' However, even acts that are commercial on the
surface can be held governmental if the activity is such that only a
sovereign state can engage in it (e.g. the exploitation of natural resources
found on public lands)." 9 Furthermore, acts by a private party, when
120
acting under the color of law, can fall within the scope of the doctrine . In
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,21 the Supreme Court held, "the
greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular
area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to
render decisions regarding it, since the court can then focus on the
application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact... ,,122 Thus,
when a foreign state's act violates a norm of international law, which by
definition requires consensus, courts have held that the act was
"unofficial," and not accorded any protection under the Act of State
doctrine. 1 3 Because of this aspect, the Kadic 1 4 court stated, "it would be a
judgment on these acts of the government of another done within its own
territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained
through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves.
Id. (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1186.
120. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
121. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
122. Id. at 428.
123. See infra p. 536. Bodner v.Banque Paribas, 144 F. Supp. 2d 117, 130 (E.D.N.Y.
2000); Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1189.
124. 70 F.3d at 250.
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rare case in which the Act of State doctrine precluded suit under section
1350. ,,
I 5
C. International Comity
In Hilton v. Guyot,2 1 the Supreme Court defined international comity
as follows:
'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But
it is the recognition which one nation allows within its Territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws.12
International comity's philosophical underpinning is that by showing
deference to the executive, legislative, and judicial acts of another nation,
it will "foster[] international cooperation and encourage[] reciprocity,
thereby promoting predictability and stability through satisfaction of
• . • ,,128
mutual expectations.
Courts differ in how to determine if international comity should
apply. Some courts have looked to the standards laid out in section 403 of
the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
which reads, "a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when
the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable. 12 9  In determining if
jurisdiction is reasonable, the Restatement (Third) articulates eight factors
• 130
a court should consider. The other method courts use is to simply query
125. Id.
126. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
127. Id. at 164-65.
128. iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
129. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), § 403(2) denotes the following factors:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state ....
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible
for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom
the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importancc of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
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if "there is in fact a true conflict between domestic [the Alien Tort Statute]
and foreign law," '131 and if so, the principles of international comity apply.
Furthermore, courts that employ this threshold method require defendants
to show a specific legislative act or judicial statement from a foreign state
or court that clearly articulates the existence of a conflict before the
doctrine of international comity will apply.32 To illustrate, in Iwanowa,33
the court held that since the German government specifically announced
that foreign citizens might not bring a claim for wartime forced labor
against German corporations, the plaintiffs' use of the Alien Tort Statute
would be in direct conflict with German law and was therefore barred by
the principles of international comity.'
D. Alien and Tort Requirements
The first requirement any plaintiff must meet is to be an alien (they
can be a permanent U.S. resident, which is beneficial in overcoming a
forum non conveniens motion, but not a U.S. citizen). 13' As noted below,
. 136
disappearance and wrongful death torts have been held actionable.
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal,
or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and
(h) the likelihood on conflict with regulation by another state."
See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-05 (applying the Restatement factors in finding that the
plaintiffs' claims were barred by the principles of international comity).
131. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 555 (Blackmun, J., concurring
and dissenting); see Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 490; Bodner, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 129.
132. Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 129.
133. 67 F. Supp. 2d at 490-91.
134. Id. Germany's policy reason for immunizing it private corporations for their use of
forced labor during World War I was that since the war, Germany had paid reparations to
many nations and "[I]t was incumbent upon the recipient states to especially compensate
those of their citizens who were especially damaged as a result of the events of the war."
Id. at 490.
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1350; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238; see Kyler, 203 F.3d at 835 (Alien Tort claim
dismissed because plaintiff was U.S. citizen); Friedman v. The Bayer Corp., 1999 WL
33457825 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)(same). See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88,
101 (2d Cir. 2000)(holding that a U.S. resident is accorded greater deference than a foreign
alien in a forum non conveniens analysis); but see Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.
2002)(affirming district court's dismissal of the case on the grounds of forum non
conveniens); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 2002 WL 31082956 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)(dismissing case
on the grounds of forum non conveniens).
136. See infra p. 542.
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Obviously in those cases, the victim cannot bring a claim on their behalf,
and since the Alien Tort Statute is silent as to who may bring suit based on
an injury to another person, determining what law to use to determine
standing has been an issue. When a federal statute provides a right of
action but does not address survivorship, courts typically look to analogous
state law.'37 However, federal law should be used if use of state law would
defeat the purpose of the federal law.38 In Xuncax, 9 one of the plaintiffs
sued on behalf of her older sister, who had been shot and beheaded by
Guatemalan soldiers. The court found the most analogous state law was
Massachusetts's Wrongful Death Act.141 Unfortunately, Massachusetts's
law prohibited the plaintiff from bringing suit for her executed sister
because their parents were still alive, but unable to bring suit.142 Therefore,
the court used the federal statute Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),
which allowed the sister to bring a suit on her sister's behalf.1 43 The second
prong requires an alleged tort.144 In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,45 the court
defined the "tort" element under the Alien Tort Statue as "a wrong in
violation of the law of nations, and not merely a wrong actionable under
the law of the appropriate sovereign state.",14' Also, courts have further
held that it is not enough that the alleged tort violates international law,
but that they are "shockingly egregious" in order to invoke section 1350.
Before articulating those torts that have met the third prong (violation
of the law of nations), it is appropriate at this time to identify those torts
the courts have deemed not actionable under the Alien Tort Statute:1
48
Claims based on contracts,' 49 racial discrimination and wrongful
137. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000)("The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply.").
138. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 190.
139. Id. at 170.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 191.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 192. But see Cabello Barrueto v. Fernandez Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1334
(S.D. Fla. 2002)(using Florida law to determine standing).
144. See supra p. 523. See also Jogi, F. Supp. 2d at 1027 (plaintiff failed to allege a tort
because plaintiff failed to show he suffered any damages).
145. 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
146. Id. at 862-64.
147. Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983); Jogi, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1027.
148. However, courts can, and have, changed their position as to what torts are
actionable. See infra p. 534-535.
149. Wong-Opasi, 229 F.3d at 1155.
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termination,159 to stay an execution,'51 price fixing,' 2 environmental abuses
and cultural genocide,'53  fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and
misappropriation of funds,1 4 and purchasing land from a government that
wrongfully seized the land.
E. Violation of the Law of Nations
1. The Meaning of the Law of Nations
The third prong requires that the tort violated the law of nations.56 In
order to meet this requirement, courts mandate that the tort violate a
norm of international law.15 Courts define a norm of international law as
being specific, universal, and obligatory. 1 8 In determining what a norm of
international law is, courts have looked to two Supreme Court cases. In
the first case, U.S. v. Smith, 59 the Supreme Court held that the law of
nations "may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing
professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations;
or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law."' In the
second case, The Paquette Habana,"' the Supreme Court further held that:
[Wlhere there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
[c]ivilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have
made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which
they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
150. Mendonca v. Tidewater, 159 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D. La. 2001).
151. Faulder v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 1999).
152. Kruman v. Christie's International PLC, 129 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
153. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 168 (environmental abuses and cultural genocide); Aguinda v.
Texaco, 2002 WL 1880105 *1 (2d Cir. 2002)(affirming the district court's decision that
environmental abuses are not actionable under the Alien Tort Statute); Flores v. Southern
Peru Copper Corp., 2002 WL 1587224 *11(S.D.N.Y. 2002)(environmental abuses).
154. Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995).
155. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000).
156. See supra p. 523.
157. Chiminya Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F. Supp. 2d 262, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Estate II,
25 F.3d at 1475.
158. Estate 11, 25 F.3d at 1475.
159. 18 U.S. 153 (1820).
160. Id. at 160-61.
161. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but
for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.162
Accordingly, the courts, when faced with whether an alleged tort
violates the Law of Nations, have looked to the following works to
determine if a tort violates a norm of international law: Restatement
(Third), the Foreign Relations law of the United States, United Nation's
Charter and agreements,' 64 Nuremberg Charter and Principles,' 65 the
Hague Convention of 1907,166 American, European, and African
162. Id. at 700.
163. See Abdullahi, 2002 WL 31082956, at *4; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531,
1542 (N.D. Cal. 1987)[hereinafter Forti f]; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 710
(N.D. Cal. 1988)[hereinafter Forti II]; Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1140; Xuncax, 886 F. Supp.
at 185 n.27; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
164. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 3 U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948), cited as authority in Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1052; Wiwa, 2002 WL
319887, at *6; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882; Forti 1, 672 F. Supp. at 1542; Forti 11, 694 F. Supp. at
710; John Doe I v. Uncocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, *25 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Doe
I]; Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 122; Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 185 n.27. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9, 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), cited as authority in Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1052;
Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *7; Forti 1, 672 F. Supp. at 1542; Forti II, 694 F. Supp. at 710; Doe
1, 2002 WL 31063976, at *25; Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 185 n.27. Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, 39 U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), cited as authority in Wiwa, 2002
WL 319887, at *6; Cabello Barrueto, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1332; Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 185;
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240. Convention Against Torture and Degrading Treatment, art. 16, 39
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), cited as authority in Wiwa,
2002 WL 319887, at *7. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, Annex 34, U.N.
GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 186, U.N. Doc. A134/46 (1979), cited as authority in
Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *11. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials, Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Principle 9, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev.1, at 112, (1990), cited
as authority in Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *11. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A.Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975), cited as
authority in Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951), cited as authority in
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
165. The "Nuremberg Code" cited by Abdullahi, 2002 WL 31082956, at *4. "Nuremberg
Charter," annexed to the London Agreement on War Criminals, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59
Stat 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, cited as authority in In re World War II Era Japanese Forced
Labor Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at
122. The "Nuremberg Principles" cited as authority in Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 122.
166. Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 122.
2003]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 10.2
167168. 16
conventions,"' International Tribunals, Geneva Conventions, 169 and
American Constitutional Law.17  Additionally, the requirement that a
norm of international law be universally accepted is a strict one.'71 Absent
this requirement, "the courts of one nation might feel free to impose
idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the name of applying international
law."'i In Filartiga,'73 the court looked to The Paquette Habana to
conclude that international law is not stagnant but evolving. 74 In The
Paquette Habana,'75 the Supreme Court recognized that although the rule
prohibiting seizure of an enemy's coastal fishing vessel during wartime was
one of comity, it had developed over the preceding century into "a settled
rule of international law" by "the general assent of civilized nations." '76 As
a result, Filartiga117 and its progeny define international law by today's
standards rather than by 1789 standards .7
.z 179
In Xuncax, the court held that a norm is universal and obligatory if:
(1) No state condone[s] the act in question and there is a recognizable
"universal" consensus of prohibition against it; (2) there are sufficient
167. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Official Records, art. 7(2)-(3),
OEA/Ser.KIXVI/1.1, Doe. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2 (1970)(signed but not ratified by the United
States), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), cited as authority in Forti 1, 672 F. Supp. at 1542;
Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1051; Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *8; Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at
185 n.27. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Official Records,
arts. 1, 8, Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/I1.65, Doc. 6, May 2, 1948, noted in Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d
at 1052: European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 1, Nov. 22, 1984, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 24 I.L.M. 435 (1985), cited as authority in
Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 185 n.27; Alvarez-Marchain, 266 F.3d at 1052. African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 12, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60, cited as authority in
Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1052.
168. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 36 I.L.M. 908 (Case No. IT-94-1-T, May 7, 1997), cited in
Cabello Barrueto, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1333; Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *9. Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T, 39 I.L.M. 557 (May 2000), cited in Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *9.
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia cited in Cabello Barrueto, 205 F.
Supp. 2d at 1333; Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *9.
169. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43.
170. The Thirteenth Amendment cited as authority in Doe 1, 2002 WL 31063976, at *9.
The Eighth Amendment cited as authority in Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 187.
171. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 175 U.S. at 694.
176. Id.
177. 630 F.2d at 881.
178. Id.
179. 886 F. Supp. at 184.
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criteria to determine whether a given action amounts to the prohibited
act and thus violates the norm; [and] (3) the prohibition against it is
nonderogable and therefore binding at all times upon all actors.18°
Therefore, it is not enough for a tort to be recognized by the international
community; there must exist a consensus among the international
community as to the tort's definition in order to be actionable under the
Alien Tort Statue.18 In Forti 1,12 the court dismissed claims of causing
disappearance, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment because although
they enjoyed universal condemnation, there lacked a consensus as to the
definition of these claims. 183  Because these claims lacked universal
definition, the court held they violated rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
• 184 185
of Civil Procedure: failure to state a claim. In Xuncax, decided eight
years after Forti I, the court found that while "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment" held universal condemnation, it still lacked international
consensus as to its definition. 18' However, instead of dismissing the claim,
the court looked to the Eighth Amendment's jurisprudence to define the
tort.187 The court concluded that when an act "is proscribed by the
Constitution of the United States and by a cognizable principle of
international law[, it] plainly falls within the rubric of 'cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment' and is actionable before this Court under § 1350. "188
Another method in which an alleged tort can be regarded as meeting
the "specific, universal, and obligatory" requirement is to be a peremptory
norm of international law, or jus cogens norm."' A jus cogens norm is a
norm of international law that is binding on nations regardless of whether
or not that nation agrees to it.'9 An example of a jus cogens norm is any of
the principles in the United Nations Charter proscribing the use of force.9
Although "a jus cogens violation is, by definition, 'a violation of specific,
180. Id.: Chiminya, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 262; Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *5.
181. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 404 (recognizing that although terrorism is universally
condemned there lacks a consensus as to its definability and therefore cannot be included
among those crimes of universal concern).
182. 672 F. Supp. at 1543.
183. Id.; but see Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *8 (finding cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment definable and actionable under the Alien Tort Statute).
184. Fori 1, 672 F. Supp. at 1543.
185. 886 F. Supp. at 186.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Doe 1, 2002 WL 31063976, at *8.
190. Id. at *8 n.14.
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102.
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universal, and obligatory international norms' that is actionable under the
[Alien Tort Statute],"'19 a violation can meet the requirement to be a
"specific, universal, and obligatory international norm[]" 193 without being
regarded as a jus cogens norm.
2. Torts Requiring State Action.
As a general rule, torts actionable under the Alien Tort Statute
require state action. In fact, early in its jurisprudence "only individuals
who have acted under official authority or under color of such authority
may" invoke the Alien Tort Statute.9 4  As stated above, formally
recognized states and their agents can only be sued in a limited set of
circumstances. 95 However, an organization not formally recognized by the
U.S. State Department can still be found a state for purposes of section
1350.196
In Kadic,1 97 the plaintiffs sued the defendant, Radovan Karadzic, in his
capacity as the leader of a self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb government often
referred to as "Srpska."'1 9 The plaintiffs alleged that military forces under
the command of Karadzic committed acts of rape, forced prostitution,
forced impregnation, torture and summary execution against them.1 99
Since these torts generally require state action in order to be actionable
under section 1350, the plaintiffs had the burden to show either "Srpska"
was a state or Karadzic had acted in concert with another state.2 °
However, "Srpska" was not formally recognized by the U.S. State
Department. 1
International law defines a state as "an entity that has (1) a defined
territory and (2) a permanent population, (3) under the control of its own
government, and (4) that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in,
192. Doe I, 2002 WL 31063976, at *8 n.15.
193. Id.
194. Estate 1, 978 F.2d at 501-02; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791-95 (holding that there lacked
universal consensus as to whether a private actor could be held liable for violating the law
of nations).
195. See supra pp. 524-530.
196. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. "While 'Srpska' was found to be a state, the court also held that since Karadzic's
acts of torture and summary execution were performed in furtherance of genocide and war
crimes, these claims did not require state action." Id. at 244.
201. Id.
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formal relations with other such entities. 20 2 The court found that "Srpska"
met these requirements and that proscriptions of international law apply to
recognized and unrecognized states.' ° The court further recognized that
this definition simply requires the capacity to engage in formal relations
204
with other states but not be formally recognized by other states. In fact,
U.S. "courts have regularly given effect to the 'state' action of
unrecognized states."205 The difference between a recognized state and an
unrecognized one is that a recognized state enjoys certain privileges and
immunities with regard to judicial proceedings (e.g. FSIA).0 6
Absent acts committed by a state actor, state action can still be found
through the acts of a private actor, when they have acted "under color of
law." To determine if a private actor acted under the color of law within
the context of an Alien Tort claim, courts have employed the standards
found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.07 Under section 1983 jurisprudence, courts
have applied a variety of tests to determine if conduct occurred "under the
color of law:" 1) The Nexus test ("whether there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity
so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
202. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 201.
203. Kadzic, 70 F.3d at 245.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 244; see, e.g., United States v. Insurance Cos., 89 U.S. 99, 101-03
(1875)(seceding states in Civil War); Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1868)(same);
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 F.2d 686, 699 (2d Cir. 1970)(post-World
War II East Germany). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 202 cmt. B ("An entity that
satisfies the requirements of § 201 is a state whether or not its statehood is formally
recognized by other states."). But see Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791 n.21 (holding that the PLO
failed to meet international law's definition of a state).
206. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244.
207. Id. at 246; Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *13; Sarie, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1146; Unocal, 110
F. Supp. 2d at 1305. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
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itself"'0 8 ); 2) The Symbiotic Relationship test (whether the State has "so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with a private actor
that there exists a "symbiotic relationship"'M ); 3) The Public Function test
(when a private actor exercises "powers traditionally exclusively reserved
to the State, 21° State action is found.); and 4) Joint Action test (when a
private actor is "a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its
agents," '' then State action is present.). It is the "joint action" test that
has been most commonly used by courts dealing with Alien Tort claims:
For purposes of an Alien Tort claim, a "private individual acts under color
of law within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together with state
officials or with significant state aid. '1
Joint action can be found in two ways: 1) under either the
"Conspiracy" test or 2) the "Cooperative Action" test. Under the
"Conspiracy" test, state action is attributed to a private actor when "both
public and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal.
2 13
Under the "Cooperative Action" test, state action is attributed to a private
party when there is a "substantial degree of cooperative action" between a
214State and private actor, or "overt and significant [S]tate participation"
exists in the deprivation of the plaintiff's Constitutional rights .2" Through
the use of the "joint action" test, private actors have been held to be state
actors liable for torts committed either by themselves or not. The
following two cases, which implicated Nigeria, illustrate this point.
In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,26 former citizens of Nigeria
brought suit against two corporations, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company
(a Dutch corporation) and Shell Transport and Trading Company (an
English corporation).2 7 In Wiwa, 18 the defendants moved for dismissal for
208. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345. 351 (1974).
209. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,175 (1972).
210. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352.
211. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); John Doe I v. Unocal, 963 F.
Supp. 880, 891 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ("[W]here there is a 'substantial degree of cooperative
action' between the state and private actors in effecting the deprivation of rights, state
action is present."); Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *13.
212. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245; see also John Doe I, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1306-07 (using both
"joint action" and "public function" tests); Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1153-54 (same).
213. Cunningham v. Southlake Ctr. for Mental Health, Inc., 924 F.2d 106, 107 (9th Cir.
1991).
214. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989).
215. Hoai v. Vo, 935 F.2d 308, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
216. 2002 WL 319887, at *2.
217. Id.
218. Id.
[Vol. 10.2
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
219lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs were members of an
organization known as "the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
People" (MOSOP). 220 MOSOP opposed the defendant's oil-excavation
activities on land that was taken from the plaintiffs without adequate
compensation. 22' To ensure that the development activities of the area
would proceed as usual, the defendants recruited the Nigerian police and
222
military to quash MOSOP's opposition. What resulted was a campaign
of systematic attacks upon the local population of Ogoni, in which two of
MOSOP's leaders were summarily executed through hangings while other
Ogoni residents "were beaten, raped, shot and/or killed during these
raids. ,223
Since the alleged torts were only committed by state agents (i.e. the
Nigerian police and military), the plaintiffs had to demonstrate acts that, if
proven true, would show "a substantial degree of cooperative action
between" the defendants and the Nigerian officials in order to substantiate
a claim.)24 The plaintiff alleged the following: That in February 1993, the
defendants met with Nigerian officials in England and the Netherlands to
develop an anti-MOSOP campaign; that the defendants provided monies
to the Nigerian police and military for the purpose of securing weapons;
that the defendants provided intelligence to the Nigerian police and
military in order to facilitate the campaign of terror; that the defendants
actively participated in planning specific raids; that the defendants bribed
or attempted to bribe witnesses to give false testimony against one of the
plaintiffs; that the defendant supplied the Nigerian military with
helicopters and boats to attack Ogoni villages; and that the defendants
paid the Nigerian military to violently answer complaints regarding oil
spills and to "contain" protests against the defendants. 2 ' The court found
joint action.226
The defendants in Wiwa 22 argued that the plaintiffs must demonstrate
that the defendants acted in concert with the Nigerian government for
219. Id. at *1 (in addition to the argument that plaintiff's claim lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, the defendants also moved for dismissal for claims that the plaintiffs failed to
state a claim for which relief may be granted).
220. Id. at *2.
221. Id.
222. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *2.
223. Id.
224. Id. at *13.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at *14.
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each alleged tort.2 z The court held that section 1983 jurisprudence
provided that "individuals engaged in a conspiracy with government actors
to deprive others of their constitutional rights" are not required to be an
active participant in each tort to be held liable for each tort.229 Therefore,
under section 1983 jurisprudence, the plaintiffs' complaint is not required
to aver that the defendants and the Nigerian governments acted in concert
for each alleged act.23°
In Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.,2" the plaintiffs alleged that Pfizer
administered an experimental drug, Trovan, to their children without their
consent.2" As a result of this experimentation, plaintiffs claimed eleven
children died while others suffered paralysis, deafness and blindness. 3
The court recognized that the Nuremberg Code, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and FDA regulations prohibited
using experimental drugs on humans without their consent and, therefore,
234
was a violation of international law. Pfizer argued that in order to be
held liable under the Alien Tort Statute this claim required state action
and, since they acted alone, plaintiff's claim should be dismissed. 21' The
court agreed that these claims required state action. However, through
application of the "joint action" test, the court found Pfizer to be an agent
of Nigeria because Nigeria 1) had provided a letter of request to Pfizer
requesting the FDA allow exportation of Trovan, 2) had arranged for
Pfizer's accommodations in Nigeria, 3) assigned Nigerian doctors to assist
Pfizer, 4) back-dated an "approval letter" required by international
protocol prior to the test, and 5) silenced Nigerian physicians critical of
Pfizer's tests. 36
The most recent development in Alien Tort law is the courts'
237
recognition of third party liability. In Bodner v. Banque Paribas,
plaintiffs, descendants of defendants' Jewish customers, brought suit
against French banking institutions for aiding and abetting and conspiring
with Vichy and Nazi regimes to steal the plaintiffs' ancestors' private
228. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *14.
229. Id.
230. Id. at *14.
231. 2002 WL 31082956.
232. Id. at *1-2.
233. Id.
234. Id. at *3.
235. Abdullahi, 2002 WL 31082956, at *4.
236. Id. at *6. Although the court found Pfizer could potentially be held liable, the court
dismissed the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens. Id.
237. 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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property.23" The plaintiffs further alleged that the scheme to wrongfully
seize the Jewish property was part of the Nazi regime's genocide
239program. In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, the court held
that the plaintiffs' claims, if substantiated with evidence, sufficiently
demonstrated a violation of international law.24°
241More recently, the court in Cabello Barrueto v. Fernandez Larios
affirmed the appropriateness of aiding and abetting and conspiracy claims
under the Alien Tort Statute.242 In that case, the survivors of Winston
Cabello brought suit against the defendant for his involvement in Cabello's
murder by General Pinochet's soldiers.24 ' Although the defendant did not
personally murder or torture Cabello, the plaintiffs claimed that since he
was a member of the infamous "Caravan of Death" (a squad of soldiers
that traveled from city to city, torturing and murdering individuals
perceived to be enemies of the state) he was liable in tort for "indirect
participation."2"44 In recognizing the plaintiffs' claims of aiding and abetting
and conspiracy, the court cited recent Alien Tort case law and
245international case law in support of its decision. On September 18, 2002,
the Ninth Circuit also recognized aiding and abetting as a claim.146 The
238. Id.
239. Id. at 122.
240. Id. at 128. Unfortunately, the court's analysis as to why aiding and abetting and
conspiracy is recognized by international law is lacking. It appears that the court referred
to U.N. resolutions and the Nuremberg tribunals but fails to specifically cite them.
241. 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
242. Id. at 1333.
243. Id. at 1326.
244. Id. at 1329.
245. Id. at 1332-33. The court cited Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776 (9th Cir.
1996)("affirming district court's jury instruction allowing foreign leader to be held liable
upon finding that he directed, ordered, conspired with, or aided the military in torture,
summary execution, and 'disappearance.'"); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 2002 WL 851751, at
*24-25 (N.D. Ga. 2002)(holding defendant liable for aiding and abetting in acts that violate
international law); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1091-92 (S.D. Fla.
1997)("asserting [Alien Tort] jurisdiction over claim of conspiracy between private
defendant and state actors to cause plaintiff's arbitrary and inhuman detention"); John Doe
I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 889-90 (C.D. Cal. 1997)("permitting [Alien Tort]
jurisdiction over plaintiff's allegations that defendants conspired to commit violations of
international law"); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A (July 15, 1999).
246. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *13. Although applied to one of
the unique torts not requiring state action, slavery, there is little doubt that Ninth Circuit
would not recognize an aiding and abetting claim for torts requiring state action. This is
because torts not requiring state action are recognized when state action exists; see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 404 (identifying torts of universal concern (i.e. not requiring
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Ninth Circuit held that the standard for aiding and abetting under the
Alien Tort Statute is to give "knowing practical assistance or
encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime."' 247 In dicta, the Ninth Circuit further opined that joint venture,
agency, negligence, and recklessness were viable theories for an Alien Tort
248
case.
To summarize, courts require state action for the following violations
of international law: torture (to include rape),249 summary execution or
extrajudicial killing,"' disappearance or abduction,25  arbitrary
detention,"' cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,"' crimes againsth • 254 •. 255
humanity, right to life, liberty, and personal security, right to peaceful
256 257 258
assembly and expression, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy.
3. Private Action Torts
In Tel-Oren,259 Judge Edwards wrote in his concurring opinion that
the Alien Tort Statute applied only to state activity because there lacked a
consensus among the international community as to what torts required no
260
state activity. Judge Edwards further wrote that in the 18th and early19th centuries, writers and jurists believed that international law applied to
state action)), 702 (including torts of universal concern among torts states are obligated not
to violate) (1987).
247. Id. at *10.
24& Id. at *10 n.20.
249. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791 n.20; Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240;
Estate 11, 25 F.3d at 1473; Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 847-48: Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *6;
Tachiona, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 266; Ford I, 672 F. Supp. at 1541.
250. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791 n.20; Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243;
Estate H, 25 F.3d at 1473; Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *6; Tachiona, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 266.
251. Estate II, 25 F.3d at 1467; Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1049; Forti H, 694 F. Supp. at
711.
252. Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1052; Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *6; Xuncax, 886 F.
Supp. at 184; Ford 1, 672 F. Supp. at 1541.
253. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *12; Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184; Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at
847-48.
254. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
255. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *12.
256. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *12.
257. John Doe 1, 2002 WL 31063976, at *10; Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 128; Cabello
Barrueto, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1332-33.
258. Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 128.
259. 726 F.2d at 792.
260. Id.; see Estate 1, 978 F.2d at 501-02; Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-
07 (D.D.C. 1985).
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private actors but during the 19th century a view emerged that only states
could be held liable under international law.16' Despite this trend toward
statism, one violation survived that could be held against a stateless actor:
262piracy .
In the seminal case Kadic,263 the Second Circuit recognized that
certain conduct, whether performed by a state or private actor, violated
international law: genocide, war crimes, slavery, and piracy.'64 To support
its finding that a private actor could be held liable under international law,
the court looked to the Restatement (Third): "Individuals may be held
liable for offenses against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and
genocide., 6 ' The court gave particular notice to the Restatement's
distinguishing between those violations that are actionable when
committed by a state listed in section 702 from those violations defined as
"universal concern" found in section 404.266 Although the Restatement
defines section 404 violations as those offenses a "state has jurisdiction to
punish without regard to territoriality or nationality of the offenders," the
261. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794.
262. Id. The Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
recognized piracy as the only violation of international law to be one of universal concern.
RES'[ATEMENT (THIRD) § 404 (reporter's note 3).
263. 70 F.3d at 232.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 240 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) pt. II, introductory note.)
266. Id.
Section 702 provides:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it
practices, encourages, or condones
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c)the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d)torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment,
(e)prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f)systematic racial discrimination, or
(g)a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights.
Section 404 provides:
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for
certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain
acts of terrorism, even where [no other basis of jurisdiction] is
present.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 404, 702.
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court interpreted this to mean offenses capable of being committed by
non-state actors .
To support their claims of genocide, the plaintiffs alleged that
Karadzic personally planned and executed a plan to use "murder, rape,
forced impregnation, and other forms of torture designed to destroy the
religious and ethnic groups of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. ',2' 18
The court recognized that following the atrocities of World War II, the
international community was quick to identify genocide as a crime, and as
a result, this conviction was embodied in statutes, conventions, and
269
charters. The court further acknowledged that every authority
condemning genocide held private actors liable.270
The plaintiffs further alleged that since the acts of "murder, rape,
torture and arbitrary detention of civilians 271 were committed in
pursuance of the civil war, Karadzic, in his capacity as overall commander,
212
was liable for war crimes. Looking to Geneva Conventions and the
Nuremberg Trials as authority, the court held that individuals committing
war crimes could be held liable under the Alien Tort Statue.2" The court
also held that torture and summary executions, acts generally proscribed
by international law only when committed by state officials or under color
of law, could be attributed to a private actor when committed in
274furtherance of genocide or war crimes.,',. 275
In Tel-Oren, despite his refusal to find private actors liable under
the Alien Tort Statute, Judge Edwards opined that one day it may be
recognized that private actors may be held liable for certain violations of
276 277international law, such as slavery. KadiC recognized slavery as one of
those "handful of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual
responsibility., 27 8 In recent years, the courts have expanded the meaning
267. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
268. Id. at 242.
269. Id.
270. id. at 241-42. The court, in reaching its conclusion, specifically cited Article 6 of the
Agreement and Charter Establishing the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the Genocide
Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988).
271. Id. at 242.
272. Id.
273. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43.
274. Id. at 244.
275. 726 F.2d at 794-95.
276. Id.
277. 70 F.3d at 240.
278. Id. (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795 (Edwards, J. concurring)).
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of slavery to include forced labor. In Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.,279 the
court looked to the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the Nuremberg
Tribunals, U.S. case law, and the Restatement (Third) to support its
conclusion that forced labor not only violated international law but was a
subset of slavery and therefore, attributable to private actors, ' The Ninth
Circuit has since adopted Iwanowa's holding, labeling forced labor as the
modern equivalent of slavery.281
IV. MISCELLANEOUS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. Choice of Law
The overwhelming majority of Alien Tort cases have been brought in
either the Second or Ninth Circuits. For the most part, these two circuits
are in agreement on how the statute should be applied. However, one
particular area not agreed on is how to determine what substantive law
should be applied to Alien Tort claims (another issue due to the plain
language of the statute, which fails to articulate what substantive law
courts should apply in determining liability and damages). 18
In Filartga, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded, and in
doing so, instructed the district court to perform a choice-of-law analysis
per Lauritzen v. Larsen8 4 to determine what substantive law to apply (i.e.
whether to apply international law, Federal Common Law, forum state
law, or the foreign state's law) to Filartiga's claims. In Lauritzen, the
Supreme Court articulated a seven factor-balancing test courts should use
in conducting a choice-of-law analysis:
1) Place of wrongful act,
2) Law of the flag,
3) Allegiance or domicile of the injured,
279. 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
280. Id. at 439-40.
281. John Doe 1, 2002 WL 31063976, at *9. Although it accepted Iwanowa's conclusion,
the Ninth Circuit focused on the Thirteenth Amendment's jurisprudence to draw its
conclusion. Id. See In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F. Supp.
2d 1160, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2001)(reaching the same conclusion). But see Bao Ge v. Li Peng,
201 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding forced labor was not such an extreme form of
egregious conduct as to confer jurisdiction).
282 Tachiona, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
283. 630 F.2d at 889.
284. 345 U.S. 571 (1954).
285. 630 F.2d at 889.
286. 345 U.S. at 583-92.
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4) Allegiance of the defendant,
5) Place of contact,
6) Inaccessibility of foreign forum, and
2877) The law of the forum state.
On remand, the district court held that Lauritzen's factors favored use
of Paraguayan law because "(1) all of the events .took place in Paraguay;
(2) all of the parties lived in Paraguay when the events took place; (3) the
parties' relationships with each other were centered in Paraguay; and (4)
Paraguayan law prohibited torture."288 However, the language of Wiwa289
(decided twenty years after Filartiga) may cast doubt on the validity of
Filartiga's mandate.' 90 The court recognized that the federal courts have
never definitively resolved the choice-of-law issue and listed Filartiga's
conclusion among the different views.29' Since the court stated it declined
to address the issue, because the appeal was based on other grounds, it
may reasonably be inferred that the issue is not firmly settled in the
Second Circuit .
In John Doe I v. Unocal,'9' the Ninth Circuit held that since only jus
cogens violations were alleged ("violations of norms of international law
that are binding on nations even if they do not agree to them"), it was
preferable to apply international law to the plaintiff's claims instead of the
law of any particular state. 94 This is because "the law of any particular
state is either identical to the jus cogens norms of international law, or it is
invalid."'2 9 The court further held that its decision to apply international
law was buttressed by the application of the choice-of-law consideration
factors listed in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law § 6 (1969).' 96
The factors are as follows:
1) The needs of the interstate and international systems;
287. Id.
288. Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 864. See Estate 1, 978 F.2d at 503 (approving the district
court's use of the tort law of the state where the underlying events occurred).
289. 226 F.3d at 105 n.12.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. See Tachiona, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 268 (recognizing Filartiga's mandate and
requiring both parties to submit briefs analyzing which law to apply).
293. 2002 WL 31063976, at *9.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at *11-13.
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2) The relevant policies of the forum;
3) The relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue;
4) The protection of justified expectations;
5) The basic policies underlying the particular field of law;
6) Certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and
7) Ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 9'
The court recognized that international law has been developed
largely in a criminal context rather than civil, and since every tort claim
had a criminal equivalent, it was appropriate to look to the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda for the
standards for aiding and abetting.298 However, the court admonished that
its holding was limited to the facts of the case and that international law
may not be appropriate in another case were facts are different. 99
An alternative to the choice-of-law analysis employed by the Court of
Appeals of the Second and Ninth Circuits is to simply apply international
law to any Alien Tort claim. In reaching this conclusion, the Xuncax3°°
court articulated several reasons that favored this method.30 ' First,
domestic tort law is often inadequate in addressing Alien Tort claims such
as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.0 2 Second, to apply
domestic tort law to an Alien Tort claim would "mute[] the grave
international law aspect of the tort, reducing it to no more (or less) than a
garden-variety municipal tort."30 3 Third, while it may be difficult to forge
"a remedy from the amorphous body of international law, ' '304 federal
courts have successfully handled similar challenges in the past."5 Finally,
297. Id. at *28 n.6 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
298. Id. at *12.
299. Id. at *12 n.25. However, see Judge Reinhardt's concurring opinion. Judge
Reinhardt considered the question of whether a third party may be held liable in tort for a
government entity a violation of international law as an ancillary issue and therefore it
should be decided using the Federal common law. Id. at *24-30. Judge Reinhardt further
held that application of the Restatement's factors favored Federal common law, not
international law. Id.
300. 886 F. Supp. at 182.
301. Id. at 183.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 182.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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this method would allow federal courts "to develop a uniform federal
common law response to international law, ' '3 6 a uniformity that is in
keeping with the Alien Tort's intent.3"7
B. Statute of Limitations
The simple language of section 1350 does not contain a statute of
limitations. When faced with a federal statute in which Congress failed to
provide a statute of limitations, courts are required to apply the statute of
limitations of the "most closely analogous statute of limitations under state
law."3  However, there is an exception to this rule: courts should apply a
federal statute's limitation period the statute "clearly provides a closer
analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake
and the practicalities of litigation make the [federal statute] a significantly
more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking. ' ,309  Accordingly,
courts have found the TVPA as the closest analogous statute to the Alien
Tort Statute, closer than any available state law. 10
In Wiwa,31' the district court held that to apply New York's one-year
limitations period for assault, battery, and false imprisonment "would
frustrate the federal policies at stake in the Alien Tort Statute,32 which is
"to allow victims of international law violations committed in a foreign
country to redress those violations in United States courts.",313 The court
recognized that an Alien Tort Statute plaintiff faces obstacles normally not
present in state tort claims: 1) evidence is often more difficult to gather, 2)
witnesses may be hesitant to testify for fear of reprisal from corrupt
governments, and 3) the continuation of human rights violations may cause
delays. In support of its decision, the Wiwa"' court further recognized
306. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 182.
307. Id. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964) (citing
section 1350 as a statute "reflecting a concern for uniformity in the country's dealings with
foreign nations and indicating a desire to give matters of international significance to the
jurisdiction of federal institutions.").
308. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *18.
309. Id.
310. Id. at *19.
311. 2002 WL 319887, at *18.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. ld.
315. Papa, 281 F.3d at 1012.
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the trend to adopt the TVPA's 10-year limitation's period by previous
courts. t6
However, there are instances when the TVPA's generous ten-year
limitation period is insufficient due to no fault of the plaintiff. Courts have
used equitable tolling to cure this deficiency. The essence of equitable
tolling is to suspend the limitation period from accruing because a plaintiff
is either unaware of or unable to bring a claim through no fault of his or
her own, particularly when the defendant actively misleads the plaintiff.
3 1
318
In Cabello Barrueto, the victim's family was told by General Pinochet's
military regime that Cabello Barrueto was killed while trying to escape.19
However, they refused to disclose the location of the body and provided
the family with three separate death certificates that further confused the
issue concerning the circumstances around Barrueto's death.'20 Because of
General Pinochet's military regime's deliberate concealment of evidence
as to the true nature of Barrueto's death, the court held that the limitation
period tolled until 1990, when a civilian government replaced Pinochet's
121
military regime.
322In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, the Ninth Circuit stated that equitable
tolling could be applied to periods when the defendant is either absent
from the jurisdiction or is immune from lawsuits, or when the plaintiff is
• • . /123
imprisoned or incapacitated. However, extraordinary circumstances
outside the plaintiff's control should be present in order to apply equitable
tolling.'24 The defendant, former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos,
had the Philippine Constitution amended to make himself and his officials
immune from lawsuits for acts committed while in power.3zs Marcos
exercised considerable control of the judiciary and suspended Habeas
Corpus from 1972-1981.3"' Furthermore, the plaintiffs had a reasonable
fear of torture and reprisal if they tried to bring a suit against Marcos or his
316. Id. (adopting TVPA's limitation period as the standard for Alien Tort claims); In re
World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1180; Iwanowa, 67
F. Supp. 2d at 462; Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1195-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
317. Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 135.
318. 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1327.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1330.
321. Id.; see Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 135 (holding that under an alternative theory,
equitable tolling could be applied because the defendants actively misled the plaintiffs).
322. 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
323. Id. at 773.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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officials in the Philippines."' The Ninth Circuit held that these facts were
sufficient to meet the "extraordinary circumstances" standard.3'
2
Therefore, the limitation period tolled until 1986, when Marcos left office
and moved to Hawaii and since the claim was filed in March 1986, well
329
within the Hawaiian limitation period of two years, it was timely.
Another method courts have used to allow plaintiffs to bring suit
beyond either the TVPA's or a state's limitation period is to apply a rule
most often used in employment discrimination cases, the continuing
violation doctrine.330 The premise of the continuing violation doctrine is
simple: "the limitations period for a continuing offense does not begin
until the offense is complete., 31 However, the reasons for employing this
doctrine must be compelling."' As stated above, the plaintiffs claimed that
the defendants plundered and confiscated French Jewish property
entrusted to the defendants during World War II and that the defendants'
activity was part of an overall scheme to aide and abet the Nazi regime's
plan of genocide.333 The court held that, if the plaintiffs' claims were
correct, the defendants' repeated denials of any wrongdoing and their
failure to return the plaintiffs' funds "constitute[d] a deliberate,
continuous, and ongoing violation of international ... ."'34 Therefore, the
court held that the TVPA's statute of limitations had not begun to accrue,
and the plaintiffs were allowed to bring suit for a claim that originated over
a half-century earlier.33
C. Remedies
Unlike some torts actionable under federal law, there is not a
statutory cap on damages awarded for a successful Alien Tort claim. 3 "
Considering how egregious the claims can be, it is hardly surprising that
compensatory damages often range in the millions. Furthermore, the
Alien Tort Statute is silent on whether punitive damages are allowed.337
Again, considering the egregious nature of the violations (torts so heinous
327. Id.
328. Hilao, 103 F.3d 773.
329. Id
330. Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 134 n.12.
331. Id. at 134.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 134-35.
336. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000) (statutorily capping the amount a claimant
can receive for compensatory damages in a Title VII discrimination suit).
337. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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that the international community has agreed upon their proscription), the
courts have exhibited no reservations in allowing punitive damages to be
awarded.338
The following is an illustrative example of the damages1- • 339
(compensatory and punitive) awarded: Filartga, for summary execution
and torture, $385,000 in compensatory and $10,000,000 in punitive
damages340 Xuncax,341 victims of summary execution $2,000,000 in
compensatory and $5,000,000 in punitive damages and torture victims
$1,000,000 in compensatory and $2,000,000 in punitive damages;342 Forti v.
Suarez, for arbitrary detention, torture and summary execution, $3,000,000
in compensatory and $3,000,000 in punitive damages;3 43 Quiros de
Rapaport, et al., v. Suarez-Mason, "for torture and murder of one victim
and disappearance of another, 3 44 $15,000,000 in compensatory and
$15,000,000 in punitive damages;345 Paul v. Avril,346 for six victims of torture
and arbitrary detention each awarded between $2,500,00 and $3,500,000 in
.341
compensatory damages and $4,000,000 in punitive damages; Trajano v.
Marcos, for torture and summary execution, $4,161,000 in total damages.348
V. CONCLUSION.
From its inauspicious and innocuous beginning, the Alien Tort Statute
has become a law, to be respected, if not feared, by multinational
companies that engage in commercial activities with corrupt regimes. 349
However, it appears that the ground-swell of cases brought under this
statute over the past decade is about to subside. This is due in large part to
338. Tachiona, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 276.
339. 577 F. Supp. at 861.
340. Id.
341. 886 F.Supp. at 198.
342. Id.
343. Tuchiona, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 279.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
347. Id. at 335.
348. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 199 n.45.
349. On November 11, 2002, another lawsuit was filed (this time in the Eastern District of
New York) on behalf of South Africans seeking relicf for alleged acts of torture, murder,
rape, arbitrary detention and inhumane treatment by the apartheid government of South
Africa. South Africa: NGO Files Apartheid Reparations Lawsuit in USA, BBC
MONITORING, Nov. 12, 2002, available at 2002 WL 102569068. Several major U.S.
corporations were named as defendants: Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Exxon Mobil, Ford,
General Motors, and IBM. Id.
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the Bush administration. While the State Department under the Clinton
administration generally avoided getting involved in Alien Tort cases,
Bush's State Department is not.35° For a second time within a year, the
State Department has intervened on behalf of a major corporation being
sued for alleged violations of human rights by asking the court to dismiss
the case on grounds of international comity (specifically, that if the suit
went forward, it would impair U.S. foreign relations).35' It remains to be
seen, though, if defendants, particularly those that were significant
campaign contributors to the Republican Party, will be able to use the
Bush administration to shield them from liability in U.S. courts for
engaging in human rights violations. Regardless, absent a legislative act or
Supreme Court fiat to the contrary, the Alien Tort Statute is becoming an
effective vehicle to remedy past and deter future egregious acts:... A
vehicle to be used to pursue that "ageless dream to free all people from
brutal violence. 353
350. Waldman, supra note 15.
351. Id.
352. In the U.S. commonwealth Island of Saipan in September 2002, dozens of U.S.
retailers, including notable retailers as Abercrombie & Fitch, Target, Gap Inc., and J.C.
Penny Co. Inc., settled three lawsuits out of court for $20 million dollars. Alexci Oreskovic,
$20 Mil. Settlement in Sweatshop Suits, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Vol. 227, No. 64, Sept.
30, 2002, available at 2002 TLI 4. The suits, brought in part under the Alien Tort Statute,
alleged that the retailers would hire impoverished Chinese women and bind them to
"shadow" contracts, which required the women to work 2 to 3 years in order to pay off
special "recruitment fees." The contracts further prohibited activities such as dating, getting
pregnant, attending church or criticizing their employers. Id. As part of the settlement, a
monitoring system will be emplaced to ensure better working conditions. Id.
353. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
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